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BALANCING OPEN SOURCE PARADIGMS AND
TRADITIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
MODELS TO OPTIMIZE INNOVATION
Lisa Mandrusiak*
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyrights and patents grant property rights to creators and inventors in order
to spur further innovation through the dual approach of increasing the amount of
material in the public domain and rewarding inventors and creators for their efforts.
However, in recent years, it has been postulated that extensive granting of
copyrights and patents may in fact stifle additional creation and development. This
led to a revolt in the computer programming industry and spawned the open source
movement, which provides software with its source code and a license allowing for
free creation and distribution of works. This movement attempts to spur innovation
in an alternative manner,1 primarily by promoting contribution to the public
domain. This open source concept has spread to other realms normally protected
by copyright through systems like the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons
is a non-profit organization devoted to expanding the breadth of creative works
available in the public domain for others to legally build upon and share.2 The
organization has released several copyright licenses (known as Creative Commons
licenses) that authors can choose from and use to protect their works in lieu of
traditional copyright. These licenses allow creators to communicate which rights
they reserve, and which they waive for the benefit of recipients and/or other
creators.
Although it does not provide the same commercial gains to creators as
traditional copyrights, the widespread use of the Creative Commons licenses in the
digital creative world and subsequent increase of material in the public domain
suggest that the open source movement may be useful to spur innovation in other
areas. Biotechnology, such as genetic and molecular biology research that leads to
the development of useful therapeutics, is one area where open source was
postulated to be useful to counter the over-proliferation of patents hypothesized to
suppress innovation.3 As such, the Boston-based Science Commons was developed
in 2005 to bring the open source movement to biotechnology through various
projects designed to increase the amount of scientific data available in the public
domain. The implicit goal of the Science Commons project is to replace traditional
intellectual property systems, such as patents, and to promote innovation by
increasing access to knowledge conferred through open access approaches. This

* J.D. candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law. The Author thanks Professor Thomas
Ward for his valuable input and advice, and Bernard von Bieberstein for his careful editing.
1. See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, The GNU Project, in FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED
ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 15-31 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002).
2. CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
3. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
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Comment provides the first substantive analysis of whether the Science Commons
is succeeding in its attempts to promote innovation. Because there are challenges
inherent in the practice of biotechnology, such as the large financial costs
associated with research and development of pharmaceuticals and the absence of an
appropriate community, this Comment suggests that open source biotechnology as
envisioned and implemented by the Science Commons is not successful in
promoting innovation because the Science Commons attempts to promote
innovation only by increasing the amount of material in the public domain,
ignoring the incentive effects of rewarding inventors with patent rights and the
related commercial benefits.
This Comment postulates a compromise where premarket or “upstream”
knowledge such as unknown gene sequences is shared through open source
systems like the Science Commons, but downstream developments such as
pharmaceuticals that act on the gene to treat a particular disease are patentable
according to intellectual property norms. However, this Comment also suggests
modifying the traditional patent system to be stricter, thereby resulting in fewer
patents. This proposed system maximizes shared knowledge by publicizing
information that is generally not patentable to begin with, potentially making
further development easier. This system will also likely encourage innovation at
all levels, from individual users to large pharmaceutical companies.
In Part II, this Comment explores the historical background and traditional
legal practice of copyrights and patents, both of which were developed to increase
the amount of material in the commons and reward inventors and creators for their
work with a temporary monopoly. Part III follows the ideological change
suggesting that traditional intellectual property norms do not actually promote
innovation and reveals how an over-proliferation of proprietary rights is now
considered to stifle innovation. The open source movement and its attempts to
solve these problems by increasing the amount of material in the public domain are
addressed in Part IV of this Comment, with particular attention paid to the
development of the Creative Commons as an alternative means to copyright to
promote innovation. Part V follows the expansion of the Creative Commons model
to the world of biotechnology and details the three main projects of the Science
Commons: the Biological Materials Transfer Project, the Scholar’s Copyright
Project, and the Neurocommons. In Part VI, these three projects are compared to
existing practices and critiqued for their effectiveness in promoting innovation,
with this Comment illustrating that none of the projects are ultimately successful.
Several theories underlying the failure of the Science Commons are discussed in
Part VII, one based on the realization that these approaches attempt to promote
innovation by increasing the amount of material in the public domain without
invoking the incentive or reward system for inventors and creators. Based on this
discussion, an alternative solution is proposed in Part VIII. In Part IX, this
Comment concludes that a combination of traditional intellectual property
protection and open source approaches is the most effective way to promote
innovation in the field of biotechnology.
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND PATENT PRACTICE
The United States Constitution specifies that Congress is authorized “[t]o
promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes
to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and
[d]iscoveries . . . .”4 Related to the “useful arts” phrase, one of the first acts of
Congress was to pass the Copyright Act of 1790,5 which has subsequently
undergone several reformations broadening the scope of protection and expanding
the terms of protection to arrive at its current form.6 Although the Copyright Act
undoubtedly confers valuable rights upon authors without requiring much, or even
any, effort on their part to secure protection,7 judicial decisions have emphasized
that the primary purpose of this grant of power is to provide an incentive for
innovation by increasing the amount of material in the public domain, noting that
reward to the owner of the patent or copyright is a “secondary consideration.”8
Copyright law covers the broad range of literary and artistic expression,
including such varied works as books, public performances, songs, movies, and
computer programs.9 Ideas themselves are not copyrighted; it is the author’s
expression of the work in a tangible medium that is protected.10 The copyright
owner (who may be someone other than the author if the author assigns the
copyright to another person or entity) has the exclusive right to carry out or
authorize reproductions, preparation of derivatives, distribution of copies, and
public performance or display of the copyrighted work.11 If a third party infringes
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed) (current version codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-205 (2006)).
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-205 (2006). Section 102 outlines copyrightable subject matter broadly to
include literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomime, pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works, motion pictures, sound recordings, and other audiovisual works, and architectural
works. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Section 302 sets the standard term for copyright protection as the life
of the author plus seventy years after the author’s death, with various exceptions in subsequent sections
for anonymous or institutional authors, etc. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
7. Section 102 makes it clear that a copyright automatically exists in any original work of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Formality requirements such as
registration, notice, or marking have largely been abandoned by the United States’ ratification of the
Berne Convention, which states that copyright shall “not be subject to any formality.” Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5(2), Sept. 29, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341.
8. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). See also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (emphasizing that the limited monopoly
privileges granted by copyright are the means by which the “important public purpose” of motivating
creative activity and allowing the public access to such activity may be assured).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
10. Id.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). If a third party infringes on any of these rights, the copyright owner
may sue for an injunction and/or damages. However, there are limitations to these exclusive rights, such
as the fair use doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). Certain uses of copyrighted material that would
otherwise be considered to be infringing are allowable if they meet the requirements of the fair use
doctrine. Id. Classic examples of uses that are permitted under the doctrine include using the
copyrighted work for criticism, comment, teaching, or research. For application of the criteria set forth
in section 107, see Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
research scientists’ photocopying of individual articles from scientific journals for archiving purposes to
make later research easier was not fair use). But see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
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upon any of these rights, the copyright owner may sue for an injunction and/or
damages.12
Parallel to protecting the useful arts through copyright, scientific
improvements were protected by the first patent statute passed in 1790,13 although
a system including a board of examiners responsible for determining whether to
grant a patent resembling that of today was not put in place until 1836.14 In
contemporary practice, examiners from the Patent and Trademark Office review
each utility patent15 application for patentability based on five criteria:16 (1) utility
and subject matter; (2) novelty (the invention is not published or known to the
public prior to filing the application); (3) non-obviousness (inventiveness); (4)
whether it is described fully in the application; and (5) whether the description
would allow one skilled in the art to carry out the invention.17 The current term for
patents is twenty years from the date of filing the application, with limited
extensions available under some circumstances.18 As with copyright, the Supreme
Court has reiterated that the primary purpose of patent law is the promotion of
innovation, rather than the reward of individual effort.19 Promoting innovation is
achieved by the two-fold approach of (i) increasing the amount of material in the
public domain after the patent expires and (ii) providing material incentives to
inventors with the monopoly conferred through the patent rights during the life of
the patent.20
Patent law covers new and useful processes, machines, manufacture,
compositions of matter, and improvements thereof to which a patent has been
granted,21 and the scope of subject matter protectable under patent law has long

(1994) (applying the fair use doctrine and finding that a parody rap version of Roy Orbison’s wellknown song “Pretty Woman” constituted fair use and, therefore, did not infringe the copyright). In
order to use a copyrighted work for purposes that are not considered fair use, it is necessary to obtain the
consent and authorization of the copyright owner.
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-05 (2006).
13. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (1790) (repealed) (current version codified at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1-376 (2006)).
14. DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS 5-6 (2009). The 1836 Act established the Patent
Office and an examination system where applications were evaluated with respect to novelty over the
prior art. Additional requirements such as non-obviousness were not included until the revisions in the
1956 Act were made. Id. at 12.
15. There are three types of patents: plant patents, design patents, and utility patents. They all vary
in terms of requirements for patentability and granted terms of protection. Since utility patents are the
most common form of patent and are most pertinent to the following discussion, all later uses of the
word “patent” should be understood to refer to utility patents only.
16. See generally Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (applying these
criteria).
17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006).
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154-155 (2006).
19. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945). Later cases have
reiterated this principle, emphasizing that the primary goals of patent law are fostering and rewarding
invention and promoting disclosure of inventions in order to stimulate further innovation. See, e.g.,
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 1998).
20. See Sinclair, 325 U.S. at 330.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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been considered to be “anything under the sun that is made by man.”22 Abstract
ideas, laws of nature, and physical phenomena such as naturally occurring products
are excluded from patent protection.23 Once a patent is obtained, the patent confers
upon the patent owner the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or
importing the invention.24 If a third party infringes upon any of these rights, the
patent owner may sue for an injunction and/or damages.25 Therefore, in order to
make or use a protected invention, a third party must obtain permission from the
patent owner, usually in the form of a license whereby the patent owner is
compensated.
III. COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAWS ACTUALLY STIFLE INNOVATION
A. Problems with Copyright Overprotection: Loss of Innovation
and Access to Culture
Despite reiteration by the Supreme Court that promoting innovation is the
primary goal of the Copyright and Patent Acts, cultural theorists suggest that the
extensive property rights conferred by patents and copyrights may have precisely
the opposite effect. One of the first to voice this position was Richard Stallman,
who premises his concerns on changes in copyright law that dramatically increased
the scope and number of proprietary rights of copyright holders, thereby decreasing
the opportunity of the public to work with and use copyrighted works.26 Numerous
copyrights can work to prevent access to history and culture, as poignantly
illustrated by law professor Michael Heller with the example of a documentary
featuring Martin Luther King, Jr.27 Most of the public is aware of Dr. King’s
legacy through indirect means such as recorded speeches or collected information
as presented in the Emmy Award-winning documentary Eyes on the Prize.28 This
culturally important documentary draws on interviews with hundreds of Dr. King’s
acquaintances and tremendous numbers of media sources including video footage,
photographs, and music.29 In order to make the documentary without the threat of

22. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting the Committee Reports
accompanying the 1952 Patent Act, S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); H. R. REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)).
23. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). There are some exceptions that are not considered to be
infringement. See supra, text accompanying note 11. For example, medical practitioners carrying out a
patented method of treatment on a patient are free from liability. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006). In
addition, research performed for the purposes of fulfilling requirements for registration with a federal
agency, such as the Federal Drug Administration agency, does not constitute infringement. 35 U.S.C. §
271(e) (2006).
25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-84 (2006).
26. See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, Misinterpreting Copyright—A Series of Errors, in FREE
SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 77-86 (Joshua Gay ed.,
2002). Another example is the Audio Home Recording Rights Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.,
which imposed technological design constraints on the manufacture of copying devices. 17 U.S.C. §
1002 (2006).
27. MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 9 (2008).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 10.

2010]

BALANCING OPEN SOURCE PARADIGMS

309

lawsuits, the filmmakers had to secure licenses from each copyright owner.30
Clearly, even if copyright owners negotiate in good faith, the cost of finding and
bargaining with each one can be challenging. In some instances the cost of
“clearing rights” for each copyright may be prohibitive, as evidenced by the twenty
years spent in jumping through legal hoops to re-release the film.31 Challenges
were greater for the re-release than the original version because of the increase in
the number of copyrights involved. This increase was due to the expansion in the
number of partial owners of or heirs to the copyrights and the overall increase in
the cost of copyright licenses, especially those for music.32 Attempts to re-release
the film were nearly thwarted, and in some cases the filmmakers could not obtain
licenses for certain materials, requiring replacement of these materials before the
film could be shown.33
In addition to dealing with myriads of copyright holders and the associated
licensing challenges, changes to copyright law have created additional complexity.
Stallman asserts that extending copyright terms and preventing digital workarounds
by implementing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) shifts the focus
of copyright law from spurring innovation and aiding the public to assisting large
publishing and recording companies.34 Expanded proprietary rights can now be
used as a weapon by publishers to maintain their monopoly by imposing
restrictions on the general public. These restrictions are arguably necessary
because the public now threatens their monopoly in ways as never before by having
the means to easily produce their own copies inexpensively.35
Advances in digital technologies and the Internet, and with them the
commensurate ability of individuals to easily copy, modify, and redistribute
content, are the underlying premises of Stanford Law School Professor Lawrence
Lessig’s criticisms of how copyright is stifling, rather than spurring, innovation.36
Lessig postulates that standard copyright law cannot coexist with the digital
technologies of today for several reasons. As it stands now, copyright law confers
the right to make copies to the copyright owner alone. However, in this digital age,
“[e]very act on the Internet is a copy.”37 When surfing the Internet each website or
image that appears on the computer screen is translated from the code of the
original website publisher’s site and necessarily conveyed in the form of a digital
copy. As such, acts that were unregulated and legal, such as reading a book, are
30. Id. The bulk of the licenses expired after the broadcast of the film in 1987, and did not include
distribution rights for use in new media like DVDs. Id. This hampered the filmmakers’ attempts to rerelease the documentary. Id.
31. HELLER, supra note 27, at 11.
32. See Katie Dean, Cash Rescues Eyes on the Prize, WIRED (Aug. 30, 2005),
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2005/08/68664 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
33. HELLER, supra note 27, at 11.
34. See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, Copyright and Globalization in the Age of Computer Networks, in
FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 133-44 (Joshua Gay
ed., 2002).
35. Id. Examples of improvements to the ease of copying include the transitions from photocopiers
to scanners, from VCRs to TiVos, and music production technology, such as CD/DVD burners,
samplers, etc.
36. Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2004).
37. Id. at 6-7.
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now regulated within the scope of copyright law when carried out in the digital
environment.38
Lessig also points out that digital advances and the laws that authorize them39
are dramatically altering the way that copyright is enforced.40 For instance, before
the use of the Internet became widespread, copyright violations were regulated
through the courts, and a judge was ultimately responsible for determining whether
a violation existed or whether a user’s conduct was permissible.41 Now,
programming code written into digital technologies dictates what access a user is
entitled to, and the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA ensure that a user
cannot get around such code.42 In this sense, the copyright holders are enforcing
copyrights themselves, rather than through the traditional court system.
Legal activists are responding to the change in regulation and enforcement of
copyright law and potential abuse thereof through undertakings such as the Chilling
Effects Clearinghouse, a group dedicated to protecting online activity from
copyright-based legal threats that may be impermissible violations of free speech.43
Concerned Internet activists founded the group in 2001 based on the observation
that the unregulated private practice of sending cease-and-desist letters under the
auspices of the DMCA was increasing and potentially having a “chilling effect” on
speech and fair use of copyrighted material.44 Specifically, although fair use of
copyrighted material is permitted,45 it is necessary for a user of software protected
by the DMCA to break the provisions of the DMCA in order to carry out a fair use.
As such, the DMCA can be viewed as preventing access to materials that would
otherwise be in the public domain. Although Stallman, Lessig, and Heller base
their positions on different aspects of copyright practice, they all reach the same
conclusion, and in light of this, it appears that the Supreme Court’s long-standing
assertion that copyrights promote innovation46 may not be accurate.
B. Problems with Patent Overprotection: Tragedy of the Anticommons
Concern that changes in the implementation, scope, and enforcement of
copyright law are stifling innovation has been echoed in the world of patents.
38. Id.
39. For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (adding 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205 and 28 U.S.C. § 4001, and substantially amending
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 104A, 108, 112, 114, 117, 701).
40. Lessig, supra note 36, at 7-8.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010)
(with contributors from the Harvard, Stanford, Berkeley, University of San Francisco, University of
Maine School of Law, George Washington School of Law, and Santa Clara University School of Law
clinics).
44. Id. In some instances, overly aggressive tactics or misrepresentations by copyright owners to
suppress legal activities have even led to law suits. See, e.g., Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 391
F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (tortuous interference, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (misrepresentation of
copyright infringement and tortuous interference).
45. See supra note 11.
46. See cases cited, supra note 8.
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Michael Heller, a professor at the Michigan Law School, has postulated that the
existence of numerous patent proprietary rights can preclude achieving a socially
desirable outcome, a situation he termed the “tragedy of the anticommons.”47
Heller describes this situation as occurring in the field of biomedical research,
where the proliferation of fragmented and overlapping intellectual property rights
creates an anticommons that stifles scientific research.48 Supporters of this position
point to increased privatization encouraged by laws that have promoted patenting
biotechnology inventions in universities, such as the Bayh-Dole Act.49 The trend
of increased university patenting has snowballed as institutions become dependent
on licensing revenues from commercially successful patented technologies and the
associated prestige.50 However, because only a small number of patents lead to
commercial success, patenting is a bit of a lottery system,51 although the risks of
obtaining a patent are not just un-recouped expenses for the university, but also lost
opportunities for other researchers who are blocked from carrying out downstream
research without obtaining a license.
The problem with an increased number of upstream patents or patents
generally related to research tools (rather than to marketable products such as
pharmaceuticals) has been succinctly summarized by law professor Mark Lemley:
“[W]hile in theory patents spur innovation, they can also interfere with it. Broad
patents granted to initial inventors can lock up or retard improvements needed to
take a new field from interesting lab results to commercial viability.”52 A recent
survey indicates that scientists attribute problems of delayed or blocked access to
necessary materials and knowledge to poor management of intellectual property
rights, with no correlative benefits in spurring innovation.53

47. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1998). In this article Heller notes that after the fall of
Communism, there were many open air kiosks in front of empty stores in cities, and concludes that,
since many agencies and private parties had proprietary rights governing the use of store space, it was
extremely challenging for a new retailer to negotiate the use of that space. This prevented the effective
use of store front property, and became the classic example of the tragedy of the anticommons. Id. at
622-24.
48. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 701.
49. Universities and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015
(1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are
Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1378-84 (2007). Professor de Larena notes
that, although the stated intention of the Bayh-Dole Act was to standardize the rules of ownership
regarding inventions created using federal research funds, the impact has been much wider, and BayhDole is commonly perceived as the impetus behind a dramatic increase in the number of patents
obtained by universities. Id. The Bayh-Dole Act provides strong incentives to apply for patents because
patent rights are granted to the inventors, rather than to the government funding agency. Megan Ristau
Baca, Barriers to Innovation: Intellectual Property Transaction Costs in Scientific Collaboration, 2006
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, ¶ 14, http://www.law.duke.edu/ journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006dltr0004.pdf
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
50. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 49, at 1381.
51. Id. at 1381-82.
52. Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 618-19 (2005).
53. Zhen Lei et al., Patents Versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protection for
Biological Research, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 36, 37-38 (2009). However, a dissenting group of
scholars suggest that the rise in the level of biotechnology patenting has no adverse effect on innovation.
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A more nuanced view is that while innovation is proceeding, at least in some
areas, there are also problematic areas where a proliferation of patents is hampering
the progression of crucial research. For example, negotiating licenses and transfer
of material for even a single patented product may be prohibitively costly and timeconsuming for legally unsophisticated scientists or those researching diseases
unlikely to be commercially successful.54 The number of patents involved
multiplies these prohibitive costs, and obtaining licenses, necessary to avoid the
even more costly problem of infringement litigation, becomes an extremely
daunting task.
The consequences of high transaction costs are stifled innovation and less
research. Such stifling may prevent drug development in any area, but it is
particularly notable in relation to diseases prevalent in developing countries
because pharmaceutical companies are not interested in investing in areas where
they believe they will not be able to make the large returns needed to justify their
initial legal investment. In addition, the smaller companies and university research
labs that do work on these projects are stymied by their inability to gain sufficient
and timely access to needed patented subject matter.55
The tragedy of the anticommons in preventing crucial drug development has
been articulated by Bennett Shapiro, former vice president of Merck & Co., Inc.
(Merck), in relation to schizophrenia.56 Shapiro states:
[People taking] compounds for schizophrenia, a disorder of the dopamine system,
often develop other disorders some of which resemble Parkinson’s disease,
another disease involving the dopamine system. A rational approach to discovery
of improved schizophrenia drugs would be to target specific dopamine receptors.
But if different companies hold patents on different receptors, the first step on the
57
path to an important and much needed therapeutic advance can be blocked.

The implications of patent over-proliferation are underscored by examining the
whole process a company such as Merck must go through to bring a potential drug
to the market. For example, Merck must uncover any potential side effects of a
compound before spending millions of dollars on clinical tests and development.
However, if the materials necessary for undergoing research to determine side
effects (such as new or improved assays,58 crucial proteins such as dopamine
receptors, etc.) are patented, the research phase becomes prohibitively expensive.59
Specifically, before Merck can test the compound with a particular receptor using
the correct assay, Merck must obtain a license from every patent owner involved.
This onerous task is necessary because in order to be approved for use, the
David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the
Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1679-80 (2007).
54. Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to Revolution? Patent-Based Open Science, 59 ME. L. REV. 339,
355 (2007).
55. Ann Weilbaecher, Comment, Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentivize
Innovation, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 281, 285 (2009).
56. HELLER, supra note 27, at 53.
57. Id.
58. An assay is a biological or immunological test carried out in a laboratory, often to detect the
presence or absence of a substance in a sample or the activity level of a drug or the like.
59. HELLER, supra note 27, at 54.
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compound must be demonstrably safe and effective. Therefore, every patent
involved becomes a “tollbooth” where Merck must pay money to the patent owner,
and if it is determined that the entire field of research will be too costly, Merck will
simply abandon the project and move on to an area of research that is less
challenging both legally and financially.60 Unfortunately, the real loser in this
scenario is the public, which is denied access to a potential cure to a devastating
disease. Therefore, as with copyrights, it appears that the Supreme Court’s
assertion61 that patents promote innovation may not be accurate.
IV. CURING STIFLED INNOVATION: DEVELOPMENT OF THE
OPEN SOURCE MOVEMENT
The first allegation that proprietary laws such as the Copyright Act of 1976
were not stimulating innovation came from the computer programming industry.
In the early days of computer programming, proprietary restrictions on the source
code of software were rare and hackers shared their code widely.62 However, one
consequence of the Copyright Act of 1976 was that many manufacturers stopped
distributing source code and began using copyright and restrictive software licenses
to limit or prohibit copying and redistribution to prevent software from being
appropriated by their competitors.63 These increased copyright restrictions have
been suggested to be counterproductive to the innovation and knowledge
generation that copyright was intended to encourage.64 Although the hacker
community resented this change, most of them were able to work within the
system.65 However, Richard Stallman, a computer hacker working at MIT, was not

60. Id. However, there may be some relief for companies like Merck in sight. The research
exception for activities carried out in relation to FDA approval has recently been expanded to include a
broader range of activities, including preclinical research. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). In light of this broadened exception, fewer patents would have a “tollbooth”
effect. However, interpreting whether a particular use would be exempt or not could involve costly
litigation (at least currently) and thus it may be simpler or easier to obtain a license or move on to
different research.
61. See supra note 19.
62. Brewster Kahle, a hacker at MIT in the 1970s and 1980s, discusses the effect of the Copyright
Act of 1976, emphasizing that before the Act copyrights had to be affirmatively asserted, so many works
were not copyrighted. Transcript of Interview with Brewster Kahle, NerdTV #4: Brewster Kahle, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/cringely/nerdtv/transcripts/004.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). However, after the
Act was passed, the formality requirements for copyrights were largely dropped, and works became
automatically copyrighted. Id. Institutions like MIT and various companies immediately capitalized on
this change for commercial profit. Id.
63. Id.
64. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS] (postulating that aspects of the internet that are part of the commons promoted the tremendous
innovation that resulted in the Internet as we know it, and warning that changes in copyright and patent
laws will stifle further creativity and progress unless users fight back). Lessig states:
The argument of this book is that always and everywhere, free resources have been
crucial to innovation and creativity; that without them, creativity is crippled. Thus, and
especially in the digital age, the central question becomes not whether government or the
market should control a resource, but whether a resource should be controlled at all.
Id. at 14.
65. JANET HOPE, BIOBAZAAR 7-8 (2008).
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among them.66
Stallman fought back by developing a “free” software project (where “free”
refers to the liberty of others to use source code for any purpose rather than price)
based on an operating system he developed called GNU.67 Stallman launched the
GNU project in 1984 together with the GNU Manifesto, which explained the
purpose of the project to hackers and requested their participation and support.68
The GNU project works together with the Free Software Foundation to ensure free
software remains a part of the public domain, promoting innovation by ensuring
that software remains accessible to all to build on and change as they please.69
In order to achieve this goal, Stallman created a license that focuses on “the
rights of software users instead of software owners,” called a “copyleft” license,
now referred to as the General Public License (GPL).70 The GPL elegantly
guarantees that further innovations belong to the public: under its terms the owner
of the work grants users broad rights to use, modify, or distribute the work in any
way they like, free of charge.71 If a user builds on the work and develops a new
product or a modified version, the user must make the new work freely available to
the public under the same terms.72 In other words, the license grants users access
to a continually growing commons from which they cannot withdraw.
Hackers embraced the GPL, thereby ensuring its success and the thriving
development of a large computer programming public commons. The most well
known example is Linux: an operating system developed communally by hackers
based on the terms of the GPL.73 Although Linux is an operating system generally
favored by computer programmers rather than by the public for use on personal
computers, the Internet as we know it would not exist except for open source
software.74 For example, the 100,000 servers at Google all run on Linux and are
widely used by the public.75
The development of Linux, the crowning success of Stallman’s free software
movement, marked the birth of a closely related, but philosophically different
branch-off: open source software.76 The Open Source Initiative (OSI), recognizing
the successes of the Free Software Foundation and the GPL, hopes to improve upon
them by combining the free software concept with the standard proprietary model
to reach a broader community.77 The OSI acknowledges the superiority of free
software, noting:
66. Id. at 4-5, 8.
67. Id. at 8-9. GNU is a recursive acronym standing for “‘Gnu’s Not UNIX.’” Id. at 9.
68. Id. at 9. For a copy of the GNU Manifesto, see The GNU Manifesto, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM,
http://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
69. FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, http://www.fsf.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
70. HOPE, supra note 65, at 11.
71. See GNU General Public License, GNU.ORG, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html (last visited
Oct. 19, 2010).
72. Id.
73. HOPE, supra note 65, at 11-13.
74. Id. at 16 (stating that “the Internet is built, overwhelmingly, on open source software”).
75. Id.
76. David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 18
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 180 (2004).
77. Id.
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When programmers can read, redistribute, and modify the source code for a piece
of software, the software evolves. People improve it, people adapt it, people fix
bugs and this can happen at a speed that, if one is used to the slow pace of
conventional software development, seems astonishing. We in the open source
community have learned that this rapid evolutionary process produces better
software than the traditional closed source model, in which only a very few
programmers can see the source and everybody else must blindly use an opaque
78
block of bits.

The OSI created the open source movement based on this superiority,
expanding the reaches of the free software movement from the hacker community
to commercial users. The open source movement merges the key concept of free
software, providing the source code, with the more traditional proprietary norms of
copyrights, maintaining that some intellectual property law needs to exist to protect
cultural producers.79 Under the open source movement, the rights to be retained by
the copyright holder are self-determined by the copyright holder’s choice of
license.80 For example, the Artistic License 2.0 (one among many licenses
selectable) is designed such that the copyright holder maintains some artistic
control over the development of the work by allowing users to freely copy and
distribute the work, but not to change and then distribute changed versions of the
work.81 This approach attempts to promote innovation by increasing the amount of
material in the public domain in combination with conferring rights to the creator.
However, the rights retained by the creator tend to be along the lines of artistic
control rather than rights that may be exploited for commercial gain.
The success of the open source software movement sparked interest in other
areas, and projects expanding the concept of open source to other domains
traditionally protected by copyright were born. The most prevalent of these is
Creative Commons, founded in 2001 by cultural activist Lawrence Lessig.82
Lessig’s concerns regarding accessibility to creative cultural works and the
dramatic expansion of copyright terms and coverage83 guides Creative Commons’
attempts to promote innovation by increasing access to creative works in the public
domain and providing a series of licenses users can choose from, communicating
which rights they reserve and which rights they waive for the benefit of recipients
or other creators.84 As with the OSI, the approach Creative Commons adopts
78. OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (Nov. 28, 2006, 2:04 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/
20061128020422/http://www.opensource.org/ (last accessed by searching for www.opensource.org in
the Internet Archive Index, Oct. 19, 2010).
79. HOPE, supra note 65, at 15.
80. Licensing, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (Sept. 24, 2006, 1:21 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/
20060924132143/http://www.opensource.org/licenses/index.php (last accessed by searching for
www.opensource.org/licenses/index.php in the Internet Archive Index, Oct. 19, 2010).
81. Artistic License 2.0, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/artisticlicense-2.0.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
82. History, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about/history/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2010) [hereinafter History].
83. See THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 64, at 106-07 (describing the expanded scope of current
copyright protection); see also id. at 250-57 (describing changes Lessig would like to see in copyright
law).
84. See History, supra note 82 (detailing the exponential growth of Creative Commons around the
world). As of 2009, Creative Commons has provided licenses for over 130 million works. Id.
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confers rights to the creator generally related to artistic control rather than rights
which can be exploited for commercial gain, unlike those associated with
traditional copyright.
V. OPEN SOURCE PARADIGMS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE SCIENCE COMMONS
Based on the presumption that excessive patenting stifles innovation in fields
such as biotechnology, Creative Commons launched a new project in 2005 called
Science Commons.85 Although not explicitly put forth by Science Commons, the
implicit goal appears to be promoting innovation by using open source strategies to
replace traditional intellectual property systems such as patents. The stated goal of
Science Commons is to promote “faster, more efficient web-enabled scientific
research” by identifying and lowering “unnecessary barriers to research” and
thereby “unlocking the value of research so more people can benefit from the work
scientists are doing.”86 In other words, the goal of Science Commons is to promote
innovation for the benefit of the public, just as the goal of the Intellectual Property
clause in the Constitution and subsequent patent legislation is to promote
innovation for the benefit of the public.87 Therefore, in order to be successful,
Science Commons must promote innovation at least as much as the systems
currently in place.
Science Commons is designed to build on Creative Commons’ approach, and
is based on the belief that innovation carried out by scientific enterprises is
impossible without easy access to materials, publications, and data.88 Therefore,
Science Commons launched projects to improve access in these three areas by
increasing the volume of, and accessibility to, materials in the public domain.89
The following discussion describes how three of these projects are intended to
work. The success of the projects is addressed separately.
A. The Biological Materials Transfer Project
Biological materials are essential to biotechnology research. Cell lines,90 DNA
probes,91 and animal models92 are examples of biological materials that are crucial
for testing and validating hypotheses. Conducting research with specific materials
provides key information that cannot be replicated without access to that specific
material. However, despite the importance of biological materials for scientific
research, material transfer remains overly complex, which significantly impacts the
quantity and quality of research.
Biological materials are routinely transferred between labs subject to the terms
85. SCIENCE COMMONS, http://sciencecommons.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 8, 19 and accompanying text.
88. See SCIENCE COMMONS, supra note 85.
89. Id.
90. Cell lines are a single type of cell adapted to grow continuously when cultured in a laboratory.
91. A DNA probe is a single-stranded DNA molecule used in laboratory experiments to detect the
presence of a complementary sequence among a mixture of DNA fragments, which can indicate
presence or absence of a particular gene or mutation.
92. An animal model is a laboratory animal useful for research because it has specific
characteristics that resemble a human disease or disorder.
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of material transfer agreements (MTAs).93 These agreements, drafted by individual
institutions, are often complex documents, requiring coordination between lawyers
and technology transfer offices of the respective institutions rather than allowing
for a simple exchange of material between scientists.94 MTAs formalize the
relationship between the provider and the recipient of the material, and set forth
rules regarding commercial exploitation or publication of research based on the
material.95 Using such licenses generally involves significant transaction costs and
delays, which can be crucial in research, particularly for small researchers. In
worst-case scenarios, negotiations for a material transfer can be so protracted and
painful that a scientist may find it easier to re-make the material, often at taxpayer
expense.96
The Biological Materials Transfer Project is dedicated to improving access to
biological materials required by researchers, and draws heavily on the success of
the Creative Commons licenses. This project provides standard modular contracts
that researchers can access on the Science Commons website and then employ to
lower the costs of transferring biological materials such as DNA, cell lines, and
model animals.97
B. The Scholar’s Copyright Project
Scientific research has long been recorded in paper form to allow research to
be critiqued and built upon by others. Furthermore, scientific success is often
evaluated based on the number of publications a researcher has and the prestige of
the journals in which the research is published.98 Digital technologies replicate
paper technology and permit instantaneous publishing and copying of research.
However, the legal aspects of copyright associated with sharing research through
paper have not been adapted appropriately to the digital world.99
A unique aspect of copyright law in relation to publishing scientific research is
that, traditionally, the author of an article was required to transfer his or her rights
in the copyright to the journal publisher, allegedly necessary to protect the
copyright and coordinate reprints and the like. This is a practice that has continued
into the digital age—as owners of the copyright, online publishers can prevent
authors and people who purchase licenses to view articles from making archival
copies of the articles.100

93. Wendy D. Streitz & Alan B. Bennett, Material Transfer Agreements: A University Perspective,
133 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 10, 10 (2003).
94. Id. at 10-13.
95. See Victor Rodriguez et al., On Material Transfer Agreements and Visibility of Researchers in
Biotechnology, 2 J. INFORMETRICS 89 (2008).
96. BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS TRANSFER PROJECT, http://sciencecommons.org/projects/licensing/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
97. Id.
98. Publish or Perish, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publish_or_perish (last visited Jan.
26, 2010). “Publish or perish” refers to the notion that researchers must publish frequently in wellrespected journals in order to obtain funding. Id.
99. See supra Part III.
100. License to Publish, OXFORD JOURNALS, http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/hmg/
for_authors/licence.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter License to Publish] (indicating that if the
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Many authors and readers have found this approach to be unsatisfactory,
spawning the Open Access (OA) movement.101 Under this approach, the publisher
obtains a license to publish and the author retains the copyright in exchange for
paying a fee.102 However, as with MTAs discussed above, the solution to the
problem can be complex and legally sophisticated and may require a lawyer to
carry out the transaction. The Scholar’s Copyright Project attempts to lower the
barriers to OA by reducing transaction costs and eliminating contract
proliferation.103 Through the Scholar’s Copyright Project, Science Commons
offers a spectrum of tools and resources catering to authors who wish to publish
their work and retain copyright ownership. The Scholar’s Copyright Project does
this either by helping authors publish in an OA journal, or by negotiating a license
where the author may archive a copy of his or her article and make it freely
available on the Internet if they wish.104
C. The Neurocommons
In addition to gleaning information from empirical studies, biotechnology
researchers have access to myriad knowledge sources that must be reviewed and
incorporated into their experimental design and analysis. Some of the knowledge
sources available are peer reviewed journals, patent applications, and online
databases of genetic or protein sequences. As a result, many scientists spend as
much time on Google and PubMed105 as they do at the laboratory bench. The
founders of Science Commons posit that the explosion of available information in
biotechnology research overwhelms any one individual’s ability to store and model
all the relevant science in his or her head.106 The result is problematic: methods for
generating information have gone digital and quasi infinite, while methods for
processing and using that information remain neurological.107
The goal of the Neurocommons project is to assuage the aforementioned issue
and maximize the availability and the usability of scientific research materials such
as research articles, knowledge bases, research data, and physical materials.108 In
order to achieve this goal, the Neurocommons project attempts to render existing
databases and search engines interoperable through the “Semantic Web.” The
Semantic Web uses the current World Wide Web as we know it, but adopts
article is published in paper form or in standard online form, the author must transfer the copyright to
the publisher).
101. See Open Access Movement, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Access_movement
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
102. See License to Publish, supra note 100 (illustrating an example of an Open Access publishing
license).
103. See Scholar’s Copyright Project, SCIENCE COMMONS, http://sciencecommons.org/projects/
publishing/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
104. Id.
105. PubMed, a service of the United States National Library of Medicine, is a free search engine for
accessing a bibliographic database of citations, abstracts, and full text articles on life science and
biomedical topics. PUBMED, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
106. The Neurocommons, SCIENCE COMMONS, http://sciencecommons.org/projects/data/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2010).
107. See id.
108. Id.
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common formats and uses the same language and nomenclature so that existing
data may be integrated and combined, thus becoming more accessible to
researchers.109 John Wilbanks, Executive Director of Science Commons, describes
his image of the Neurocommons:
With this system, scientists will be able to load in lists of genes that come off the
lab robots, and get back those lists of genes with relevant information around them
based on the public knowledge. They’ll be able to find the papers and pieces of
data where that information came from, much faster and more relevant than
Google or a full text literature search, because for all the content in our system,
we’ve got links back to the underlying sources. And they’ve each got an incentive
to put their own papers into the system, or to make their corner of the system more
accurate for the better the system models their research, the better results they’ll
get. We’ll be inviting the bioinformatics community to work on both the content
and the analytic software. Neither one can easily reach potential in a single
110
organization.

As a test model, the Neurocommons project focuses on sources specific to
neuroscience and neuromedicine, rather than all biotechnology research fields.
Neuroscience is a particularly apt focus area because of the tremendous amount of
public data available from the use of computer-implemented research techniques
such as high throughput screening and gene chips.111
VI. CRITICISMS OF THE SCIENCE COMMONS PROJECTS
Despite their laudable aims of increasing the availability and amount of
material in the public domain for researchers to use, the Biological Materials
Transfer, the Scholar’s Copyright, and the Neurocommons projects are ineffective
at promoting innovation. The Biological Materials Transfer Project largely mirrors
an existing system, and is therefore redundant. Similarly, the complications that
the Scholar’s Copyright Project attempts to address are not severe enough to
actually prevent authors from utilizing currently available forms of open access
publishing, thus rendering the project unnecessary. Finally, as will be elaborated
below, the Neurocommons is unusable for researchers who lack significant
computer programming knowledge. Even if this project is imagined to be userfriendly and fully functional, it is unlikely that providing access to more data will
promote innovation, as discussed below.
A. The Biological Materials Transfer Project is Redundant
The Biological Materials Transfer Project does not contribute anything
substantial to the world of scientific research because public and universal material
transfer agreements already exist and are widely used. In the hope of “alleviating
some of the paperwork associated with MTAs,” the National Institute of Health
established the Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement (UBMTA) for use

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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by non-profit organizations.112 Institutions that sign the master agreement are able
to transfer materials under the agreement with other institutions through the use of
a simple implementing letter.113 As of 2007, there were 320 institutions signed
onto the UBMTA master agreement.114
Critics might point out that the UBMTA does not solve the problems the
Biological Materials Transfer Project attempts to address because it is only for use
by non-profits and cannot serve as a model for a profit-minded company because of
different policies, procedures, valuations, and objectives that must be written into
the contract. However, non-profit organizations are the entities likely to have the
most difficulty navigating the legal and financial hurdles of obtaining an MTA. In
contrast to an independent researcher affiliated with a university, even a small
biotechnology or pharmaceutical company is likely able to afford legal assistance
to draft an appropriate MTA when necessary. As such, the Biological Materials
Transfer Project is largely superfluous in light of the availability of, and advances
made by, the UBMTA.
Furthermore, the biotechnology research community often functions like the
hacker community, lamented by Richard Stallman as being lost,115 where members
cooperate with each other without involving institutions and their associated
formalities. For example, a student researcher may come across an article
describing a cell line that would be particularly suitable for use in her experiments.
Under the formal process, the student would go to the university’s technology
transfer office and request them to draft a request to the institution where the
research regarding the cell line was initiated. The other institution would then
prepare an MTA based on their desired terms, and the student’s technology office
would agree, disagree, or modify the MTA. However, much more commonly, the
student will simply contact the author directly and request a small sample of the
cell line. The author often chooses to respond to the informal request positively
and sends a sample to the student. Although there are situations where a request
for informal transfer is unsuccessful,116 in my experience they are relatively rare.117
B. The Scholar’s Copyright Project is Unnecessary
Open access publishing had already successfully taken off before the Scholar’s
112. Katharine Ku, Commentary, Point: MTAs are the Bane of our Existence!, 25 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 721, 722 (2007).
113. Id.
114. Id. This relatively widespread use supports the notion that the Biological Materials Transfer
Project may not be necessary.
115. See supra Part IV.
116. Legitimate reasons for denying transfer of material are easy to imagine, such as a particularly
laborious production method or protecting the ability of a student or research associate to publish related
results using the material.
117. In my three years of carrying out laboratory research on a Spinobulbar Muscular Atrophy (a rare
human genetic disease), I was never denied a request for materials from another lab. Materials provided
from other labs varied from DNA fragments to tissue from genetically modified mice. However, some
denials are reported by other scientists. In a survey conducted in 2000, forty-seven percent of
geneticists asking for information, data, or materials “reported that at least [one] of their requests had
been denied in the preceding [three] years.” Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic
Genetics, 287 JAMA 473, 473 (2002).
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Copyright Project was established, making this tool unnecessary. As such, the
Scholar’s Copyright Project does little to promote innovation by increasing access
to research data. The Public Library of Science (PLS), a nonprofit organization of
scientists and physicians and a pioneer in open access publishing, launched its first
journal in 2003118 and has since expanded to seven well-regarded, broad-topic
journals.119 PLS has been joined in the field by other prolific open access
publishers such as BioMed Central, with 206 journals,120 and the Directory of Open
Access Journals, which includes free, full text, quality controlled scientific and
scholarly journals of all subjects and languages, currently boasting 5,358
journals.121
Furthermore, some open access scientific journals currently use a Creative
Commons license.122 Suggesting that authors may need additional assistance to
navigate such licenses actually undermines the purpose of the Creative Commons
program123 and underscores this Comment’s assertion that the Scholar’s Copyright
Project is not actually required or relevant.
A potential problem with open access publishing that the Scholar’s Copyright
Project fails to address is that authors may be less concerned with increasing
accessibility to their work and more concerned with the impact factor124 of the
journal in which they publish. Many authors eschewed publishing in or even
subscribing to open access journals in the early days of open access publishing for
just these reasons.125 In the past, the prestige of open access journals had been
considered lower than that of traditional journals for various reasons;126 however,
this may no longer be the case. Standard measures of the prestige of scientific
journals such as impact factor or the number of citations now rank open access
journals on the same levels as traditional journals.127
118. See Saeed Shah, US Public Library of Science Launches Rival to ‘The Lancet’, THE
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 19, 2004), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/us-public-library-of-sciencelaunches-rival-to-the-lancet-544205.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
119. For the seven PLoS journals, see The PLoS Journals, PUBLIC LIBRARY OF SCIENCE,
http://www.plos.org/journals/index.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
120. BIOMED CENTRAL, http://www.biomedcentral.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
121. DIRECTORY OF OPEN ACCESS JOURNALS, http://www.doaj.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
122. The PLoS journals use the Creative Commons Attribution License. See License, PUBLIC
LIBRARY OF SCIENCE, http://www.plos.org/journals/license.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
123. See supra Part IV.
124. Impact factor is a measure reflecting the average number of citations to articles published in
science and social science journals. It is indicative of the relative importance of a journal within its
field; journals with higher impact factors are deemed to be more important than those with lower ones.
Impact factors are calculated yearly by Thompson Reuters. See The Thompson Reuters Impact Factor,
THOMPSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/science/free/essays/impact_factor/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
125. See generally Sara Schroter et al., Perceptions of Open Access Publishing: Interviews with
Journal Authors, 330 B.M.J. 756 (2005).
126. Gabe Bloch, Transformation in Publishing: Modeling the Effect of New Media, 20 BERKELEY
TECH L.J. 647, 669-70 (2005).
127. SCIENCE and NATURE are generally regarded as the most prestigious scientific research journals
and are routinely awarded impact factors of approximately thirty. See Impact Factor, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact_factor (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). Well-renowned specialty
journals such as GENOMICS generally rate around 3.
GENOMICS, http://www.elsevier.com/
wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/622838/description#description (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). In
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C. The Neurocommons is Unusable
Unfortunately, the Neurocommons is largely unusable to researchers who are
not also computer programmers, as acknowledged by the Science Commons
group.128 In its simplest form, the Neurocommons integrates a number of existing
public databases and allows a researcher to search them all simultaneously.
However, at this time, searches can only be run if they are written in a rare
computer code called SPARQL.129 It can be assumed that the average researcher
working in a laboratory would be unable to access these grouped databases and
would therefore resort to the current method of searching databases one at a time.
Even assuming the Neurocommons has a successful, user-friendly interface,
the concept is flawed: preventing access to data cannot logically be seen as the
problem in innovation caused by an over-proliferation in patents.130 Researchers
are never at a loss for experiments to run because they cannot read enough journals
or find related gene sequences or interacting proteins. Even in the digital world,
scientific innovation still proceeds based on the analog time frame of the individual
cogitations required to interpret data and design experiments. Therefore, high tech
solutions, such as the Neurocommons, that aim to increase access to data will not
be useful in speeding up research because each new piece of information must be
analyzed by the researcher for relevance and the appropriate hypotheses must be
adopted and tested.
As such, the Neurocommons, like the Biotechnology Materials Transfer
Project and the Scholar’s Copyright Project, is unlikely to promote innovation in
biotechnology. By understanding the reasons underlying the failure of Science
Commons, a potential workable solution may become evident.
VII. ANALYZING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SCIENCE COMMONS CONCEPT
A. Biotechnology is Not a Suitable Candidate for Open Source Approaches
As detailed in Parts IV and V of this Comment, Science Commons is modeled
on Creative Commons and the Open Source Movement. In the open source
software model, users of the software are assumed to contribute widely to the
improvement of the projects, and the project grows and expands as a result.
However, law professor Yochai Benkler has postulated that this model cannot be
extrapolated easily to biotechnology research.
Benkler established criteria for determining whether open source production

2006, PLOS BIOLOGY was awarded an impact factor of 14.7 and PLOS MEDICINE of 13.8. PLOS,
http://www.plos.org/cms/node/233 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
128. See The Neurocommons, SCIENCE COMMONS, http://sciencecommons.org/projects/data/ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2010) (stating that in the “short term this is most valuable to people who already know
how to use it. The skill set is rare and still considered a specialty. But over time the use of machineannotation should evolve into a mainstream part of biology, just as the use of machine-generated data
has evolved”).
129. See The NeuroCommons Project, SCIENCE COMMONS, http://neurocommons.org/page/
Main_Page (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
130. Scientists may publish findings less frequently or not at all in order to preserve the novelty of
their invention, a requirement to obtain a patent. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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methods can extend to new fields such as biotechnology.131 According to Benkler,
the technology must first be divided into layers.132 Using the Internet as an
example, the layers are the hardware layer (the machines running the network), the
software or code layer (the information traveling over the network), and the content
layer (the information being communicated).133 The next step is determining
whether open source paradigms would be feasible and efficient with respect to any
layer.134 For Benkler, feasibility generally requires that a layer be divisible into
small components that can be worked on by many users.135
Benkler’s analysis can be applied to biotechnology to determine whether it is a
suitable candidate for open source. Law professor David Opderbeck carried out
this analysis, splitting a biological system, such as an organism, into hardware
(cells and tissues), software (genetic code), and content (protein interaction and
chemical pathways) layers.136 Opderbeck concludes that the code layer of
biotechnology, gene sequence data, is a possible candidate for use in an open
source system, but determines that the robust competition in this field would
prevent development of an open source system.137
There are additional theoretical complications suggesting that biotechnology
may not be a suitable field for implementation of open source systems. For
instance, innovation in biotechnology involves significantly higher costs than areas
such as software development. Complex reagents and equipment are prohibitively
expensive, and as a result, there are few, if any, individual researchers: most
research is carried out on behalf of an institution.138 For this reason, the material
incentives of exclusive patent rights are likely key in order to promote innovation
and are even required to provide a rich public domain. The artistic control
conferred to creators by the rights awarded through systems like Creative
Commons would be an insufficient incentive for biotechnology researchers and/or
their backers.
The involvement of deep-pocketed institutions in biotechnology research leads
to the next potential problem: there is no “user” community in biotechnology
collaborating on the same project akin to the hacker community underlying the
open source software movement.139 Opderdeck postulates that the socialpsychological rewards inherent in the hacker community were the driving force of
open source development therein, and an equivalent community/reward system
would be necessary for open source to be successful in other areas.140 In fact, users
131. See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369
(2002).
132. Id. at 378-79.
133. FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 64, at 23-25.
134. Benkler, supra note 131, at 379.
135. Id.
136. Opderbeck, supra note 76, at 183-85.
137. See id. at 226.
138. Petherbridge, supra note 54, at 364.
139. Although this Comment analogizes researchers to hackers in terms of sharing materials in supra
Part VI, hackers as “users” of a single large scale programming project such as Linux where commercial
reward is unlikely to occur are distinguishable. Scientific researchers all work on different projects;
collaborations, as among hackers, are rare.
140. Opderdeck, supra note 76, at 192.
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in other fields (tending to be non-commercial) have also contributed discoveries to
the public domain without requiring compensation,141 supporting the notion that a
community of individual users is requisite for an open source development and
distribution system to function.
B. Problems Underlying Open Source Approaches
Even if biotechnology was a suitable candidate for implementation of open
source approaches, there are problems underlying these approaches that prevent
their success in promoting innovation. One potential problem with Creative
Commons and open source licenses is that it may be difficult to enforce such
licenses. To date, there has been no litigation concerning the validity of Creative
Commons licenses. Most disputes involving the open source General Public
License (GPL) have been settled through negotiation, and although two court cases
that have considered the GPL have held it to be valid, enforcement questions still
exist.142 In fact, it has not been clearly determined whether these licenses are
enforceable contracts or bare licenses.143 If open source licenses are considered to
be enforceable contracts, licensors will benefit from stronger enforcement of the
specific terms within the license.144 However, if the license is a bare license
permitting one to exercise rights that would otherwise be prohibited (such as a
driver’s license), there is no mutual obligation created between the parties.145
Without clarity as to the validity and enforcement of such licenses, users may be
justifiably hesitant to employ these strategies in light of the substantial legal
uncertainties about the validity of open source licenses in general and specific
license provisions in particular. Given current practices and the financial
investment inherent in most biotechnology research and development, it makes
perfect sense that a biotechnology company would be unwilling to adopt an open
source strategy for sharing knowledge or resources if the terms of such a license
may ultimately prove to be unenforceable.
Another reason that the Science Commons may not be successful at promoting
innovation is that it is based on the assumption that the Creative Commons and
Open Source Movement are themselves successful in promoting innovation.
However, it may be that these movements are not as successful as proponents
claim. In the creative utopia envisioned by Stallman, each user of a piece of open
source software would use the software for their own individual purposes,
improving and altering the code as appropriate, and releasing the improved code
back into the public domain. The system does not actually work in this manner.
For most open source projects, there are many users, but only a few developers
141. Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 467, 475-81 (2008).
142. Adrienne K. Goss, Codifying a Commons: Copyright, Copyleft, and the Creative Commons
Project, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 984 (2007) (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Quest Software, Inc.,
333 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Ill. 2004), Progress Software Corp. v. MySQL AB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D.
Mass. 2002), and Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2001)).
143. Matthew D. Stein, Rethinking UCITA: Lessons from the Open Source Movement, 58 ME. L.
REV. 157, 193 (2006).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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who actually work to change and improve the code or to develop new projects.
The remaining users ride the coattails of the developers for free.146 This is the
archetypal tragedy of the commons situation, where people “overuse” or fail to take
care of resources owned in common, and suggests that some aspect of private
ownership may be necessary to balance open source and optimize attempts to
promote innovation.
VIII. SUGGESTIONS FOR OPTIMIZING BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION
The discussion above, together with the realization that open source
approaches fail to address both aspects of the two-prong policy objectives behind
the Constitution’s goal of promoting innovation, suggest a solution to the Science
Commons’ failure to promote innovation. Specifically, the traditional modes of
intellectual property protection were created to promote innovation through the
dual approach of (1) increasing the amount of material in the commons, and (2)
rewarding inventors and creators for their work with a temporary monopoly.147
The Science Commons is exclusively directed to increasing the amount of material
in the commons and does not address the second approach.148 However, as
indicated in Part VII.B of this Comment, a rich public domain alone, without
providing material incentive for inventors and creators, may fail to stimulate
innovation. This is particularly true in a field such as biotechnology, which
requires heavy investment, and where, as a result, financial rewards for innovation
may be necessary. Biotechnology innovation would be stimulated most by both
increasing the amount of material in the commons and by rewarding inventors and
creators for their work with a limited time monopoly such as that conferred by
patent rights.
This is not to imply that the traditional patenting approach is the best
alternative. As suggested by Opderbeck, the genetic code may be a candidate wellsuited for open source approaches because this “layer” is most similar to computer
programming code.149 As such, the ideal system for promoting innovation in
biotechnology would be a combination of open source and traditional patenting.
This dual approach would prevent both the tragedy of the commons150 and the
tragedy of the anticommons.
Combinations of traditional approaches and open source have been proposed
146. Two friends who are computer programmers employed by Microsoft first suggested this point of
view. They stated that most high quality programmers do not bother working with open source software
because of the large number of bugs that do not get fixed, because no one “owns” the software and takes
responsibility for fixing errors that arise. Problems with users that do not contribute to the code have
been suggested in various other places as well. See 5 Ways to Contribute Open Source Projects Without
Coding, NONGEEK PERSPECTIVE, http://nongeeksight.blogspot.com/2006/09/5-ways-to-contribute-toopen-source.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
147. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
148. As noted in supra Part IV, the Creative Commons provides some incentive to creators in the
form of rights such as maintaining artistic control. However, limited rights that do not offer material
rewards are unlikely to be useful in the field of biotechnology, as discussed in supra Part VII.A.
149. See supra Part VII.A. For the purposes of this Comment, Benkler’s theory and Opderbeck’s
application thereof are adopted as correct.
150. The tragedy of the commons in an open source system is suggested in supra Part VII where
many users rely on a piece of software, but few contribute to its maintenance and improvement.
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as replacements for the current system. Law professor Peter Lee suggests that
publicly funded scientific research promotes commercial innovation by creating
massive amounts of basic scientific knowledge such as gene sequences,151 which is
an example of the upstream knowledge where excessive patenting can have the
most damaging blocking effects. As such, Lee suggests that the key to maximizing
biotechnology innovation is creating a “distributive commons” where institutions
conducting research with the benefit of public funds should distribute the results of
their research under quid pro quo licenses, leveraging the power of their upstream
developments (such as research tools) in order to maximize access to downstream
health technologies (such as pharmaceuticals) to the largest possible user base.152
Professor Lee’s approach, although correct in focusing on increasing the
availability of upstream knowledge such as gene sequences or other research
tools,153 fails to appreciate the role of commercial players in adopting open source
approaches. Given that most biotechnology research requires significant private
expenditure, which may be funded by the licenses associated with exclusive patent
rights, it is counterintuitive that a company would be willing to forego patent rights
and “donate” data or research to the public domain. However, sharing of upstream
knowledge by commercial entities has already happened. Although such sharing is
not born out of generosity but out of worry for competing ownership claims,154 the
results are the same: preventing anticommons concerns.
In some specific areas, such as expressed sequence tags or ESTs,155 big
pharmaceutical companies took initiative even before the patent office had an
opportunity to evaluate whether patents should be granted for ESTs.156 Companies
decided they were better off donating gene-fragment data to the public rather than
seeking patents.157 These companies hoped that donating their EST data to the
public domain would prevent patents on these sequences from delaying
downstream research that depended on access to this data.158 As an example of this
approach, in 1995, Merck created the Gene Index (a public database of gene
sequences). By 1998, Merck had published almost a million gene sequences on
this database, which were entirely in the public domain.159 Similar results were
151. Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 941 (2009).
152. Id. at 1015. As an example of a public institution that provides access to its research
conditionally, Lee points to the National Institute of Health (NIH), which encourages recipients of NIH
funding to disseminate results widely. Id. at 953.
153. Based on the application of Yochai Benkler’s formula, the genetic code and other upstream
technologies are those most appropriate for open source approaches. See supra Part VII.A.
154. For decades, IBM published the “IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin” with the explicit goal of
preventing competitors from obtaining patents on the particular developments disclosed therein, because
once the subject matter is published, it is no longer novel and thus not patentable. See supra notes 1617; IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IBM_Technical_
Disclosure_Bulletin (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
155. An expressed sequence tag or EST is a short sub-sequence of a transcribed genetic sequence.
They may be used to identify gene transcripts, and are instrumental in gene discovery and gene
sequence determination.
156. HELLER, supra note 27, at 61.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. See also Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183,
188-89 (2004) (discussing the Merck project).
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achieved in the area of single nucleotide polymorphisms,160 or SNPs, by the SNP
Consortium, a group consisting of private firms and nonprofit research
organizations intent on preempting an anticommons patent thicket from
developing.161 Law professor Robert Merges has coined the phrase “propertypreempting investments” for instances such as these where a private firm spends
significant sums of money to create assets in the public domain in order to preempt
intellectual property rights.162
The fact that some institutions have taken matters into their own hands and are
circumventing traditional patent practice in order to prevent stifling of innovation
strongly suggests that patent practice itself should be changed in order to stimulate
innovation rather than relying on solutions to come from the private sector. This is
especially true given that the activities of Merck and the SNP Consortium are the
exception rather than the rule. This notion is supported by three studies concerning
the effect of over-proliferation of patents in technological innovation.163 These
three reports conclude that it should be harder to obtain patents in the first place.
The first report by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice
concluded that “biotechnology patents might harm follow-on innovation through
the creation of an anticommons.”164 The solutions proposed included reforms that
would make it more difficult to obtain patents initially and also more difficult to
sustain them later on in the face of litigation.165 The second report by the National
Academy of Science investigated operations at the United States Patent Office
(USPTO), and found that patent quality seems to be declining, and made similar
recommendations.166 The third report by the National Research Council focused
specifically on biotechnology patents and also “concluded . . . that the standard for
patenting should be strengthened.”167
This Comment suggests a more nuanced approach to reforming the patent
system that applies the lessons from the analysis of open source approaches above.
Specifically, not all biotechnology patents should be more difficult to obtain: only
those patents directed to upstream technologies such as gene sequences or other
research tools. This strategy should work together with existing open source
initiatives to promote easier access to such upstream technologies. Researchers
working on downstream projects would be free to use upstream technologies in the
public domain to develop valuable downstream inventions such as pharmaceuticals.
Under this system, particularly deserving upstream technologies and downstream
technologies would remain protectable by traditional patent property rights. This
160. A single nucleotide polymorphism is a DNA sequence variation occurring when a single
nucleotide—A, T, C, or G—in the genome (or other shared sequence) differs between members of a
species. SNPs have a variety of uses, such as disease markers.
161. Merges, supra note 159, at 189-90.
162. Id. at 185.
163. HELLER, supra note 27, at 65.
164. Id. (referring to FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003)).
165. Id.
166. Id. (referring to NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004)).
167. Id. (referring to NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND
PROTEOMIC RESEARCH (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006)).
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approach would work to stimulate innovation by both increasing the materials in
the public domain and providing financial incentives where appropriate.
The number of upstream patents granted could be reduced in several ways.
The first would be a return to the stricter statutory notion that abstract concepts and
ideas cannot be patented.168 The idea that basic facts and natural phenomena are
not protectable under the utility requirement has softened considerably over the last
century.169 Patents for naturally occurring substances were traditionally rejected as
being directed to non-patentable subject matter until Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K.
Mulford Co., where a patent was granted directed to a purified form of adrenalin (a
naturally occurring hormone).170 Since this watershed moment, patents for
genetically modified organisms171 and mathematical algorithms for use in a
particular manner have been granted.172 Gene sequences of existing organisms or
mutations associated with a particular disease have been heavily patented under
these expansions. However, it is arguable that these “inventions” are merely
naturally existing works that were discovered rather than invented and should not
have been patented based on the subject matter requirement of section 101 of Title
35.173 Therefore, a stricter interpretation by examiners at the USPTO as to what is
patentable under the subject matter requirement could prevent such patents from
being granted.174 This precise position was recently put forth in an expansive
decision by the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York,
holding that patents to naturally occurring gene sequences were invalid because
natural gene sequences were a product of nature and thus impermissible under the
subject matter requirement of section 101.175 Although this decision will certainly
be appealed, it could mark a change in how the courts view the patentability (or unpatentability) of upstream biotechnology, such as gene sequences.
The number of patents granted should also be reduced through a stricter
application of the obviousness standard.176 A recent Supreme Court decision held

168. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
169. Section 101 defines what subject matter may be suitable for patenting as “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). See Megan Ristua Baca, Note, Barriers to Innovation: Intellectual Property
Transaction Costs in Scientific Collaboration, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, ¶ 8 (2006),
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006dltr0004.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). Such
expansions in the notion of what constitutes patentable subject matter go hand-in-hand with the propatenting position put forth by the federal government by passing the Bayh-Dole Act. See supra text
accompanying note 44.
170. 189 F. 95, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
171. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
172. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1981).
173. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
174. The Supreme Court recently reiterated that abstract concepts and discoveries are not statutory
subject matter in relation to method patents. See generally Bilski v. Kappos, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010). Although this case is related to business patents (mathematical algorithms), it is likely that the
position the Court adopted will be reflected by the USPTO in other areas.
175. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010
WL 1233416, at *51 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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that the obviousness standard should be more strictly applied.177 With application
of this stricter standard, it should become more challenging to patent inventions
that were simply the result of routine work, such as sequencing a gene. As such,
upstream discoveries, such as the discovery of a gene sequence, would not be
patentable, whereas truly inventive downstream technologies would be.
Another possibility to reduce the number of patents granted would be to
implement a third party observation or opposition system at the USPTO.178 Patent
offices in other countries around the world allow independent third parties to
present references (journal articles, other patents, etc.) that pre-date the patent
application for the Examiner to consider when evaluating an application.179 This
type of involvement should result in more relevant references being introduced to
the Examiner at an earlier stage and result in fewer or narrower patents being
granted. For example, although Examiners carry out searches, there are instances
where relevant references do not come to light. If a third party brought these
disclosures to the attention of the Examiner, it may be necessary to deny the patent
application because the subject matter is known in the field or would have been
obvious over what was already known in the field.180
Approaches such as these that result in fewer patents should appeal to
researchers on a practical level. Patenting gene sequences or other research tools is
extremely costly, and such patents generally show a poor return on investment in
terms of the licensing potential.181 Furthermore, upstream inventions like gene
sequences are more often developed by researchers in nonprofit institutions than by
those in companies, and it has been suggested that the developers of research tools
are more akin to hackers than other researchers and are more interested in sharing
results to further research than in patenting inventions for commercial gain.182
In addition to the patent-reducing measures discussed above, both nonprofit
and commercial researchers should be encouraged to adopt open source approaches
to sharing data where appropriate, such as by contributing gene sequences to online
databases or by publishing research in an open access journal. This combination of
177. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (holding that one skilled in the art of the
invention in question is not an automaton but rather has ordinary creativity and thus does not necessarily
require teaching, suggestion, or motivation to arrive at an invention).
178. The Patent Reform Act of 2005 included third party observations as one of its provisions, but
was not passed. H. REP. NO. 2795 (2005). Third party observations of patents after they have been
granted is one provision in the pending Patent Reform Act of 2009. H. REP. NO. 1260 (2009).
179. Japan uses a third party observation system where interested parties can submit relevant prior art
to the Japanese Patent Office for the Examiner to consider during Examination of a patent application.
Int’l Pat. Coop. Union, Meeting of International Authorities under the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT): Third Party Observations, at 10 (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/pct/en/pct_mia_17/pct_mia_17_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). The European Patent
Convention (EPC) includes a third party opposition system for applications during the examination
phase. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 115, Oct. 5, 1973. It also includes an
opposition procedure, through which third parties can challenge the validity of a patent with the
European Patent Office, rather than through the court system. Id. at art. 99.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17 (discussing the novelty and non-obviousness
requirements).
181. Paul N. Schofield et al., Post-Publication Sharing of Data and Tools, 461 NATURE 171, 172
(2009).
182. See Strandburg supra note 141; supra Part VII.A (discussing the motivation of hackers).
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open access to upstream materials and traditional protection for downstream
inventions should stimulate innovation.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although the legislation underlying the protection of copyrights and patents
was adopted in order to spur innovation, it appears that an over-proliferation of
property rights may in fact stifle further creations and developments. The open
source movement was spawned in an attempt to counter this over-proliferation and
increase innovation by expanding the material available in the public domain.
Open source approaches, such as Creative Commons, have been successful in
replacing traditional copyright in some situations, leading to the notion of applying
open source approaches to biotechnology to increase the amount of material in the
public domain.
Unfortunately, the three main projects of Science Commons fail to promote
innovation and are largely redundant, unnecessary, or unusable. However, the
problem may not be with the approaches adopted by Science Commons but rather
the nature of open source itself. Open source may not be as successful as its
proponents claim, and even if it is functional, it may not be adaptable to the field of
biotechnology where financial incentives and clear enforcement rules are crucial.
As such, increasing material available in the public domain alone is insufficient to
promote innovation: inventors may need commercial incentives such as the
economic benefits conferred by traditional patent rights.
This Comment postulates a compromise where premarket or upstream
knowledge, such as unknown gene sequences or other research tools, are shared
through open source systems like Science Commons, but downstream, marketable
developments, such as pharmaceuticals that act on the gene to treat a particular
disease, are patentable according to intellectual property norms. These upstream
materials would be included in the public domain through a combination of open
source approaches and stricter patenting processes whereby it becomes very
challenging to patent upstream inventions. This system maximizes shared
knowledge by publicizing information that is generally not patentable anyway,
potentially making further development easier. Downstream innovation relying on
these upstream materials would be invigorated as a result, and these downstream
inventions should be protected by traditional patent means when appropriate. A
system of this sort should encourage innovation at all levels, from individual users
to large pharmaceutical companies.

